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Abstract—We study the system-level effects of the introduc-
tion of large populations of Electric Vehicles on the power
and transportation networks. We assume that each EV owner
solves a decision problem to pick a cost-minimizing charge and
travel plan. This individual decision takes into account traffic
congestion in the transportation network, affecting travel times,
as well as as congestion in the power grid, resulting in spatial
variations in electricity prices for battery charging. We show
that this decision problem is equivalent to finding the shortest
path on an “extended” transportation graph, with virtual arcs
that represent charging options. Using this extended graph, we
study the collective effects of a large number of EV owners
individually solving this path planning problem. We propose a
scheme in which independent power and transportation system
operators can collaborate to manage each network towards a
socially optimum operating point while keeping the operational
data of each system private. We further study the optimal
reserve capacity requirements for pricing in the absence of such
collaboration. We showcase numerically that a lack of attention
to interdependencies between the two infrastructures can have
adverse operational effects.
I. INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO NETWORKS
Large-scale adaptation of Electric Vehicles (EV) will affect
the operation of two cyber-physical networks: power and
transportation systems [1]. Each of these systems has been
the subject of decades of engineering research. However,
in this work, we argue that the introduction of EVs will
couple the operation of these two critical infrastructures. We
show that ignoring this interconnection and assuming that
the location of EV plug-in events follows an independent
process that does not get affected by electricity prices can
lead to instabilities in electricity pricing mechanisms, power
delivery, and traffic distribution. Hence, we propose control
schemes that acknowledge this interconnection and move
both infrastructures towards optimal and reliable operation.
To achieve this goal, we show that an individual driver’s
joint charge and path decision problem can be modeled as a
shortest path problem on an extended transportation graph
with virtual arcs. We use this extended graph to study the
collective result of all drivers making cost-minimizing charge
and path decisions on power and transportation systems. We
then show that two non-profit entities referred to as the
independent power system operator (IPSO) and independent
transportation system operator (ITSO) can collaborate to find
jointly optimal electricity prices, charging station mark-ups,
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Fig. 1. Electric Vehicles affect transportation and power delivery networks.
and road tolls, while keeping the data of each system private.
We show that this collaboration is necessary for correct price
design. We further study the generation reserve requirements
to operate the grid in the absence of such collaboration.
Prior Art: The study of mechanisms for coping with
demand stochasticity and grid congestion is at the core of
power systems research. In particular, EVs are acknowledged
to be one of the primary focuses of demand response (DR)
programs. DR enables electricity demand to become a control
asset for the IPSO. For example, the authors in [2]–[18], and
many others, have proposed control schemes to manipulate
EV charging load using various tools, e.g., heuristic or opti-
mal control, and towards different objectives, e.g., ancillary
service provision, peak shaving, load following. However, a
common feature in [2]–[18] is that the location and time of
plug in for each request is considered an exogenous process
and is not explicitly modeled. Very few works have consid-
ered the fact that, unlike all other electric loads, EVs are
mobile, and hence may choose to receive charge at different
nodes of the grid following economic preferences and travel
constraints. This capability was considered in [19], [20] in
the problem of routing EV drivers to the optimal nearby
charging station after they announce their need to charge. The
authors in [21] consider the case where the operator tracks the
mobility of large fleets of EVs and their energy consumption
and designs optimal multi-period Vehicle-to-Grid strategies.
Here we do not consider the case of fleets and look at a large
population of heterogeneous privately-owned EVs.
Traffic engineering studies mechanisms for coping with
road congestion in the transportation network. At the individ-
ual user level, travel paths are planned to avoid congestion as
much as possible, naturally leading to shortest path problems
[22], [23]. When studying the collective actions of users,
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2the so-called Traffic Assignment Problem is concerned with
the effect of individuals’ selection of routes on the society’s
welfare, and studies control strategies to guide the selfish
user equilibrium towards a social optimum, e.g., [24], [25].
Recently, a line of research has emerged to study the effect
of EVs on transportation systems. For example, [26]–[28]
look at the individual path planning problem by minimizing
the energy consumption of EVs, leading to a constrained
shortest path problem. However, the interactions with the
power grid are not modeled. At the system-level, [29], [30]
study efficient solutions for characterizing the redistribution
of traffic due to the charge requirements of EVs (paths are
forbidden if not enough charge is received to travel them).
In contrast to our work, in [29], [30], electricity prices are
respectively not considered and taken as given. Accordingly,
these works are complementary to ours and do not address
the electricity price design aspect that we are interested in
(more details in Remark III.3). To the best of our knowledge,
the only work that considers price design is [31]. In [31],
charge is wirelessly delivered to EVs while traveling. Hence,
EVs can never run out of charge. The authors show that
if a government agency controls the operations of both the
transportation and power networks or can design tolls as
a decentralized control measure, the effect of EVs on the
grid can be optimized by affecting the drivers’ choice of
route. In spite of a somewhat similar set up, [31] and our
work have major differences: 1) Our model is different in
that we assume EVs make stops at charging stations and
the amount of charge received is a choice made by the
driver, leading to a different pricing structure, based on the
concept of virtual charging arcs; 2) We consider the IPSO
and ITSO as two separate entities and look at how they can
design prices if they collaborate together with minimal data
exchange using the principles of dual decomposition. We also
study the adverse effects of the lack of such collaboration;
3) We study how the IPSO can set prices in the absence of
such collaboration through procuring generation reserves.
Remark I.1. To be able to derive analytical results, we have
chosen to remain in a static setting. This means that the
customers’ travel demand, the baseload, and generation costs
are all time-invariant. Our preliminary work published as a
conference paper [32] models this problem under a dynamic
setting. The main contribution of [32] is proposing the
general model of the ESPP and the extended transportation
graph. However, the dynamic model studied in [32] in its
full generality was not amenable to an analytical charac-
terization of the aggregate control problem and hence could
not provide design insights. In contrast, the present work
introduces significant simplifications by considering a static
setting. The static formulation removes the non-convexity of
the problem and allows for a novel analytical treatment.
II. OVERVIEW
We study a large network of EV and Internal Combustion
Engine Vehicles (ICEV) owners that optimize their daily trip
ITSO IPSO
EV Gen.
Resrv.
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Demand d
Price p
Toll θPath k Price pGen. power g
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Fig. 2. The entities involved in the control problem.
costs, including the path they take to complete a trip as
well as refueling strategies. A short model of the decision
making process by individual EV drivers is first presented in
Section III, mainly to introduce the extended transportation
graph, a novel concept we use in this paper to integrate
individual decisions into system-level control strategies for
coupled infrastructures. The extended graph construct cap-
tures the fact that EVs’ route and charge decisions are
affected by the state of two networks, namely the power and
the transportation networks. The transportation network is
managed by a non-profit ITSO (red circle in Fig. 2), who
knows about the trip patterns of the population and can
impose tolls on public roads to affect the individuals’ routing
decisions. The power network is managed by a non-profit
IPSO (light gray circle), who controls electricity generation
costs (green circle) and is in charge of pricing electricity that
affect individual EV’s charging decisions. Ideally, we would
like to minimize the total transportation delay and electricity
generation cost that the society incurs. However, as the IPSO
and the ITSO are two separate entities, we study whether they
can achieve this goal with or without direct collaboration
under various schemes presented in Section IV (and in Fig
5). We numerically study these schemes in Section VI.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL DRIVER’S MODEL
Let us first focus on the decision making process of an
individual EV driver (the blue circle in Fig 2). In order to
complete a trip, the driver needs to decide on 1) which path
to take to get from his origin to the destination; and 2) the
locations at which he/she should charge the EV battery and
the amount of charge to be received at each location. We
model the cost structure associated with these decisions next.
Notation: We use bold lower case x to indicate vectors
and bold upper case X to indicates matrices. The notation
xI = [xi]i∈I indicates that the elements that comprise a
column vector or a matrix each correspond to a member of
a set I. The symbols  and  denote element-wise ≤ and
≥ inequalities in vectors. The transpose of a column vector
3x is denoted by xT . The all one and all zero row vectors of
size j are denoted by 11×j and 01×j respectively.
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION
V , Set of nodes in the transportation network
A , Set of arcs in the transportation network
N , Set of nodes with charging facilities
G , The transportation graph
K , Set of energy-feasible paths that connect the
origin and destination for an individual user
sk , Length of path k
λa , Flow on arc a of transportation graph
λv , Flow into charging station located at node v
pv = Price of electricity at node v
ev = Energy received at node v
Ev , Set of possible charging amounts at v
θv = Plug-in fee at node v
ρv , Charging rate at node v
τa(λa) , Latency function of traveling on arc a
τv(λv) , Wait time to be plugged in at node v
γ , Value of time to users
sa(λa) , Cost each user incurs for traveling on arc a
sv(ev , λv) , Cost to receive charge of ev at node v
ea , Energy required to travel arc a
Ge , The extended transportation graph
S , Set of nodes in Ge
L , Set of arcs in Ge
Lv , Set of virtual charging arcs for charging sta-
tion at node v
C , Set of all virtual charging station entrance and
bypass arcs
ba , The electricity bill to charge for virtual arc a
Q , Set of different origin-destination clusters q
Kq , Set of feasible paths on Ge for cluster q
mq , Rate of EVs in cluster q
fkq = rate of cluster q EVs that choose path k ∈ Kq
fq , [fkq ]k∈Kq
Aq , Arc-path incidence matrix for cluster q
g = Vector of generation outputs at all network
nodes
c(g) , Vector of network generation costs
u , Vector of inelastic non-EV demand at all
network nodes
d = Vector of EV charging demand at all network
nodes
H , The power transfer distribution matrix
c , Line flow limits
M , Matrix that maps virtual link flow to power
system load
sea(λa) = Auxilary cost function for arc a (see (18))
we(λ) = [
∫ λa
x=0 s
e
a(x)dx]a∈L
ξ , Reserve capacity prices at all network nodes
r , Reserve capacity prices at all network nodes
A. Congestion Costs
We model the transportation network through a connected
directional graph G = (V,A), where V and A respectively
denote the set of nodes and arcs of the graph.
Traveling on the transportation network is associated with
a cost for the user since he/she values the time spent en
route. The time to travel between an origin and a destination
node is comprised of the time spent on arcs that connect
Origin Destination
Fast charging station
1
2
3
4
⌧a( a), ea
Fig. 3. The transportation graph G.
these two nodes on G. Here we adopt the popular Beckmann
model for the cost of traveling an arc, i.e., a road section
[33]. Accordingly, we assume that the travel time for each
arc a ∈ A only depends on the rate of EVs per time unit
that travel on the arc, which we refer to as the arc flow and
denote by λ = [λa]a∈A. The time it takes to travel arc a
is then represented by a latency function τa(λa), which is
convex, continuous, non-negative, and increasing in λ. The
congestion cost that a user incurs for traveling arc a is given
by:
sa(λa) = γτa(λa), (1)
where γ is the cost of one unit of time spent en route. Hence,
the cost to travel link a is:
total cost to travel link a = sa(λa) + θa, (2)
where θa corresponds to any tolls that the driver should pay
to the ITSO, if any such toll is enforced for link a.
Moreover, traveling each arc a ∈ A requires a certain
amount of energy ea (see Fig. 2). Energy needs to be received
from the power grid and stored in the EV battery. The cost
that the user incurs to receive battery charge is modeled next.
B. Charging Costs
A subset of nodes on the transportation network N ⊆ V
are equipped with battery charging facilities and, hence, the
EV drivers have the choice of charging their batteries at these
locations. Naturally, to be able to provide charging services,
the nodes N are also a subset of the nodes B that constitute
the power grid graph R = (B,F). Each node v ∈ B has an
associated price for electricity pv . Consequently, if the EV
driver chooses to charge at location v, he/she will pay:
electricity cost of charging = pvev + θv, (3)
where ev ∈ Ev is the battery charge amount received at v
chosen from a finite set Ev , and θv corresponds to a one-
time plug-in fee for the charging station at v. Moreover, if v
is not the origin of the trip, the driver needs to spend some
extra time en route in order to receive charge at v. This is due
to any congestion at the fast charging stations (FCS) plus the
time it takes to receive charge. Hence, an extra inconvenience
cost is incurred. If the charging rate at FCS v is ρv , and the
4rate of EVs being plugged in for charge at this location is
denoted by λv , this cost is equal to:
sv(ev, λv)=
{
γ
(
ev
ρv
+ τv(λv)
)
, v is an FCS
0, v is trip origin node
(4)
where τv(λv) denotes the wait time due to congestion, and
is a soft cost model to capture limited station capacity.
C. The Extended Transportation Graph with Virtual Arcs
The EV driver’s goal would be to find the least cost
path that connects the origin and the destination on the
transportation graph G while making sure that the EV battery
never runs out of charge1.
Here we show that we can recast the EV driver’s route and
charge problem as a resource-constrained shortest path prob-
lem on a new extended transportation multigraph Ge(S,L).
This definition will help us study and control the aggregate
effect of individual EVs on power and transportation systems.
Definition III.1. A travel path k on the graph G is character-
ized by an ordered sequence of arc indices ak where the head
node of [ak]i is identical to the tail node of [ak]i+1 for all i =
1, . . . , sk−1. The length of path k is sk. Alternatively, if G is
simple, path k can be written as an ordered sequence of sk
node indices vk (excluding the destination node). We further
denote a vector of previously defined quantities associated
with the arcs ak using subscripts, e.g., eak = [ea]a∈ak and
sak(λak) respectively denote the vectors of charge amounts
and travel time required to travel each arc on path k.
To complete a trip, the driver incurs two forms of costs:
the cost associated with arcs and the cost associated with the
charging decisions taken at nodes. However, we can observe
charging is very similar in nature to traveling: 1) it takes a
certain amount of time (due to both charging rate limitations
and congestion); 2) it has a cost; and 3) it changes the
energy level of the battery. Acknowledging this similarity, we
transform the EV driver’s decision problem to a shortest path
problem by associating charging decisions made at the nodes
v of the transportation graph to a set of new virtual arcs to
be added at each node v ∈ N where charging is possible. At
each origin and destination node where charging is possible,
the following transformation would capture all decisions:
• The decision of how much to charge: a set of virtual
arcs Lv added at node v are each associated with a
specific choice of how much to charge, i.e., ev ∈ Ev .
Hence, the energy gained by traveling each new virtual
arc is set to be one such member of Ev (red arcs in Fig.
4). Equivalently, we can say that the energy required to
travel the virtual arc is negative. Travel time is evρv .
1Note that with the cost structure we have defined, the EV driver will
reach the destination with minimum-possible leftover charge. An extension
of the analytical framework to include the value of leftover charge at the
destination in the optimization is trivial and has been removed for brevity of
notation. We refer the reader to our conference paper [32] for this extension.
DestinationOrigin 1
2
3
4
don’t stop
stop
virtual links
corresponding to E1
virtual links
corresponding to E3
⌧a( a), ea
Fig. 4. The extended graph corresponding to Fig. 2.
At the FCS, these transformations capture all decisions:
• The decision to stop or skip stopping at a charge station
en route: the driver can either take a charging station
entrance arc (labeled “stop” in Fig 3) and plug in
their EV at the station, or skip stopping at the station
via a bypass arc with zero travel time and energy
requirements (green arcs in Fig. 3). Charging station
entrance arcs can be congested;
• The decision of how much to charge if stopping at v: the
charging station entrance arc is connected in series to a
set of virtual arcs Lv capturing the choice of amount of
charge ev ∈ Ev (blue arcs in Fig. 3).
The flow on the charging station entrance arc will capture
the wait time to be plugged in at the station. The set of
all entrance and bypass arcs for all charging stations is C.
The new extended transportation graph with these virtual arcs
would then have the following set of arcs:
L = (∪v∈NLv) ∪ C ∪ A.
Consequently, the transformed problem seeks a shortest
path on this extended graph from the origin to the destination,
with the cost of traveling each arc being the sum of its travel
time cost and all monetary charges such as the electricity bill
or tolls. The travel time costs on Ge(S,L) is given by:
sa(λa) =

γτa(λa), a ∈ A ∪ C
γ eaρv , a ∈ Lv, v ∈ N − origin
0, a ∈ Lv, v = origin
(5)
All other monetary costs can be captured as:
ba =
{
θa, a ∈ A ∪ C
pvea, a ∈ Lv, v ∈ N
(6)
and hence, each driver selfishly optimizes their trip plan by
solving the Energy-aware Shortest Path Problem (ESPP):
min
k∈K
11×sk(sak(λak) + bak) (7)
where K is now the set of energy-feasible paths that con-
nect the origin and the destination on the extended graph
Ge(S,L). Energy-feasibility of a path ensures that the battery
will never run out of charge en route. Next, we define energy-
feasibility mathematically.
5Definition III.2. A path k is energy-feasible on Ge iff ∀j =
1, . . . , sk:
0 ≤ Initial charge− [11×j ,01×(sk−j)]eak ≤ battery capacity.
These two constraints ensure that the EV never runs out of
charge en route if taking path k, and that the battery charge
state never exceeds battery capacity. A vector of dimension
zero is simply empty. Note that with this definition, we can
determine whether a path is energy-feasible independently
of the network congestion mirrored through λak . Hence, for
system-level control of λak , the set of energy-feasible paths
can be calculated offline.
Remark III.3. The ESPP (7) can be solved using Dynamic
Programming (DP) algorithms with pseudo-polynomial com-
plexity [34]. Polynomial-time Dijkstra-like algorithms for
solving the shortest path problem cannot be applied due to
the existence of the energy-feasibility constraint (see [26],
[35]). This is mainly because the cost of a path is no longer
just the sum of its arc costs (as energy constraints cannot
be attributed to individual arcs but a sum over multiple
arcs). Proposing efficient solution methods for the ESPP is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, our focus is to use
the extended graph to study aggregate control strategies. We
refer the reader to recent papers studying efficient solutions
and search heuristics for variations of ESPP, e.g., [30],
[36]–[38]. For our small numerical experiment, we use a
brute force approach to enumerate all loop-free energy-
feasible paths for all origin-destination pairs on the extended
transportation graph, as often done in the transportation
literature. While for our small experiment the complexity
of this approach does not pose a computational challenge,
in more realistic models this is an issue that needs to be
properly addressed to allow scalability. We will consider this
issue as part of our future work.
Now, imagine that every EV owner in the society solved
(7) to plan their trips. These users share two infrastructures:
the transportation network, and the power grid. Hence, col-
lectively, EVs give rise to a traffic and load pattern, deter-
mining which roads and grid buses are congested and hence,
will have longer travel times and higher electricity prices.
Through this interaction, individuals affect each other’s cost,
leading to the system-level problem that we are interested in.
IV. SYSTEM LEVEL MODEL
At the system level, the extended transportation graph
helps us study the collective effect of individual drivers on
traffic and energy loads as a network flow problem. Here
virtual arcs are added at all potential origins and FCSs.
At the aggregate level, the system variables, i.e., the flow
rate of vehicles on arcs λa, the price of electricity pv , and
the tolls θa can no longer be considered as variables imposed
upon the system but rather as variables to be jointly optimized
by system operators.
If a single entity was in charge of monitoring the state
of both networks and controlling all EVs’ charge and route
decisions, they can maximize the social welfare by solving
for the optimum route and charge plan for each individual
such the the total transportation congestion and generation
costs that the society incurs is minimized. In doing so, this
entity needs to ensure that the constraints of the transportation
and power systems are not violated. The power system’s
constraints ensure the balance of supply and demand in the
grid and that the physical limits of transmission lines are not
violated. The transportation system constraints ensure that
every driver will be able to finish their travel.
In reality, power and transportation systems are operated
by the IPSO and the ITSO respectively, and their operational
data is not shared. The IPSO is in charge of optimizing
generation costs subject to power system constraints, and the
ITSO is in charge of optimizing transportation costs subject
to transportation system constraints. Also, individuals’ route
and charge decisions can only be affected through prices.
We first study the ITSO and IPSO strategies separately in
Subsections IV-A and IV-B and their optimal pricing. Then
we look at how they interact (and possibly achieve the
socially optimal outcome) in Section V.
A. The ITSO’s Charge and Traffic Assignment Problem
We assume that drivers belong to a finite number of
classes q ∈ Q. Vehicles in the same class share the same
origin and destination. Vehicles could include both EVs as
well as ICEVs. A given class q would contain either EVs
or ICEVs but not both. Drivers of the same class q are
represented by a set of feasible paths Kq , each of which
allows them to to finish their trip on the extended graph. For
EVs, this is equivalent to the set of energy-feasible paths
given in Definition II.2 and can be enumerated offline for
each class. For ICEVs, we can assume these paths simply
include transportation arcs in A that connect the origin and
destination, and do not enter charging stations. Clearly, any
other path selection method that considers more realistic
constraints can also be applied. We leave the study of optimal
clustering mechanisms that assign heterogeneous users to a
finite of number of classes to future work.
Each customer directly affects the flow of the arcs that
constitute his/her path. To model this effect, we define:
• mq as the travel demand rate (flow) of EVs in cluster
q. This demand is taken as deterministic and given;
• fkq as the rate of cluster q EVs that choose path k ∈ Kq .
We define fq = [fkq ]k∈Kq .
Naturally, since every driver has to pick one path, the
following conservation rule holds:
1T fq = mq. (8)
Given the path decisions of all EV drivers, i.e., the fkq ’s,
the flow of EVs on arc a is given by λa =
∑
q∈Q,k∈Kq δ
k
af
k
q ,
where δka is an arc-path incidence indicator (1 if arc a is on
path k and 0 otherwise). This is written in matrix form as:
λ =
∑
q∈QAqfq, (9)
6where λ = [λa]a∈L denotes the vector of network flows and
Aq is a |L| × |Kq| matrix such that [Aq]a,k = δka .
The flow on the virtual arcs of the extended graph leads to
a power load. We denote the charging demand at each node
v ∈ B of the grid as a vector d = [dv]v∈B, given by:
d =Mλ, (10)
where M is a |B| × |L| matrix given by:
[M]v,a =
{
ea, a ∈ Lv, v ∈ N
0, else
(11)
Let s(λ) = [sa(λa)]a∈L. If an ITSO is in charge of
determining the optimal path and charge schedule for each
EV such that the aggregate cost is minimized, it can solve
a modified version of the classic static traffic assignment
problem [39] on the extended graph, which we refer to as
the charge and traffic assignment problem (CTAP):
min
fq,q∈Q
λTs(λ) + pTd (12)
s.t. (?)

fq  0, ∀q ∈ Q,
1T fq = mq, ∀q ∈ Q,
λ =
∑
q∈QAqfq, d =Mλ,
where p = [pv]v∈B.
B. The IPSO’s Economic Dispatch Problem
To serve the charging demand of EVs, a set of gener-
ators are located at different nodes of the power network
R = (B,F). For brevity, let us assume that a single merged
generator is located at each node of the grid. Assuming
that the generation at each node is denoted by a vector
g = [gv]v∈B and the baseload (any load that does not serve
EVs) by a vector u = [uv]v∈B, there are three constraints that
define a feasible generation mix g in the power grid. First of
all, gv must be within the capacity range of the generator at
node v, i.e., gmin  g  gmax. Second, the demand/supply
balance requirement of the power grid should be met, i.e.,
1T (d+ u− g) = 0. (13)
Third and last, the transmission line flow constraints of the
grid under the DC approximation [40] translate into:
H(d+ u− g)  c, (14)
where the matrix H is the power transfer distribution matrix
of the grid, explicitly defined in [40], and c = [cf ]f∈F is a
vector containing arc (line) flow limits (in both directions).
In most power grids, one such feasible generation mix g is
picked by an IPSO to serve demand. We assume that at least
one feasible generation mix always exists for every possible
load profile. The IPSO’s objective is to pick the cheapest
feasible generation mix. Let us denote the cost of generating
gv units of energy at node v ∈ B as a strongly convex and
continuous function cv(gv), and the vector of generation costs
as c(g) = [cv(gv)]v∈B. Given a demand d from EVs, the
IPSO solves an economic dispatch problem to decide the
optimal generation dispatch g∗ [41]:
g∗ = argming1
T c(g) (15)
s.t. gmin  g  gmax, 1T (d+ u− g) = 0,
H(d+ u− g)  c.
Note that the optimal traffic and generation schedules
determined through (12) and (15) minimize the total cost
to society. However, they do not necessarily minimize the
cost of each individual entity that is involved, e.g., the EV
drivers or the generators. Hence, one cannot merely ask these
selfish users to stick to the socially optimal schedule. An
economic mechanism is necessary to align selfish behavior
with socially optimal resource consumption behavior. The
use of pricing mechanisms is a way of achieving this goal in
a distributed and incentive-compatible fashion. We highlight
pricing mechanisms that can be used for (12) and (15) next.
C. Pricing Mechanism for Electric Power
To incentivize profit-maximizing generators to produce at
an output level gv , we apply the principle of marginal cost
pricing. The principle states that the electricity price at node
v, i.e., pv , must satisfy:
∂cv(gv)
∂gv
= pv → ∇g1T c(g) = p. (16)
Let us introduce Lagrange multipliers γ and µ respectively
for the balance and line flow constraints in (15). Writing the
KKT stationarity condition for (15) then leads to:
p = γ1+HTµ, (17)
commonly referred to as Locational Marginal Prices (LMP)
in the power system literature. The reader should note that
this is the same price vector p that is fed into the ITSO
optimization (12) and would affect the charging demand at
different nodes of the grid, i.e., d in (15), which would in
turn affect the price p again. This feedback loop highlights
the coupling between smart power and transportation systems
that we are interested in, further studied in Section V.
D. Tolls to Align Selfish User Behavior with Social Optimum
In the transportation network, if every user solves an ESPP
given in (7) and no tolls are imposed by the ITSO (θa =
0,∀a ∈ A ∪ C), the aggregate flow would be determined
based on a state of user-equilibrium. This user equilibrium
flow is most likely not equivalent to the social optimal flow in
(12). To mathematically characterize this equilibrium, define
an auxilary modified cost function se(λ) = [sea(λa)]a∈L for
the extended transportation graph’s arcs as:
se(λ) = s(λ) +MTp, (18)
with s(λ) and M given by (5) and (11). Moreover, let
we(λ) = [
∫ λa
x=0
sea(x)dx]a∈L. Then, according to the well-
known Wardrop’s first principle [42], the user equilibrium
7flow would be the solution of the optimization problem:
min
fq
1Twe(λ) (19)
s.t. Constraints (?) in (12)
So how can the ITSO get the individual drivers to follow
the socially optimal flow calculated in (12)? We present the
answer in Theorem IV.1.
Theorem IV.1. (Marginal congestion pricing) The aggregate
effect of individual route and charge decisions made by EV
drivers, i.e., the solution of (19), will be equivalent to the
optimal social charge and route decision in (12) iff the ITSO
imposes a toll ϑ = [ϑa]a∈L at each arc of the extended graph
equal to the externality introduced by each user that travels
the arc on the other users’ costs, i.e.,
ϑ = ∇(diag(λ)s(λ))− s(λ). (20)
Proof: Using the definition of the modified cost vector
se(λ), (12) can be written as a classic traffic assignment
problem:
min
fq
λTse(λ) (21)
s.t. Constraints (?) in (12)
The result then follows from applying classic results on
Wardrop’s first and second principles [42] to the extended
graph, acknowledging that ∇(diag(λ)b) = b.
Remark IV.2. (Congestion Mark-up at Charging Stations)
The arc toll θa on the virtual charging station entrance arcs
would correspond to a congestion mark-up (plug-in fee) for
all EVs stopping at each station. This captures the user
externality introduced by limited charging station capacity.
The spots at FCSs located at busy streets and highways or
ones that allow a user to take less congested routes are
coveted by many drivers and thus have higher plug-in fees.
V. INTERACTIVE NETWORK OPERATION
For scalability reasons, the IPSO cannot be expected to
consider detailed models of the transportation system demand
flexibility when calculating the prices p. However, we next
show that completely ignoring the interconnection between
the two infrastructures (the status-quo) can have adverse
effects on both infrastructures. This motivates us to introduce
a collaborative pricing scheme using dual decomposition. The
schemes we study for interactions between the IPSO and
ITSO towards network operation are highlighted in Fig. 5.
A. Greedy pricing
Let us look at the scenario that would happen if no
corrective action is taken in regards to how the grid is
operated today and hence, smart transportation and energy
systems are operated separately. In this disjoint model, the
IPSO ignores the fact that the load due to EV charge requests
can move from one grid bus to another in response to posted
Fig. 5. The different network operation schemes studied
prices. Instead, LMPs are designed assuming that charge
events will happen exactly as in the last period (this could
be the previous day, the average of the previous month, etc.).
On the other hand, the ITSO ignores the effect of EV charge
requests on electricity prices, and takes electricity prices as
a given when designing road and FCS congestion tolls.
Claim: Under this greedy pricing scheme, the congestion
and electricity prices θ and p could oscillate indefinitely.
We substantiate this claim through a numerical example in
Section VI. This, along with the loss of welfare experienced
when our infrastructure is operated at a suboptimal state,
motivates us to look into schemes which can allow the ITSO
and IPSO to operate their networks optimally and reliably.
B. Collaborative pricing
Proposition V.1. An efficient market clearing LMP p can
be posted through a ex-ante collaboration between the IPSO
and ITSO following a dual decomposition algorithm.
Proof: A market clearing price is efficient (maximizes
social welfare) if the flow and generation values λ∗ and g∗
are the solution of:
min
fq,g
λTs(λ) + 1T c(g) (22)
s.t.

fq  0,
1T fq = mq,
λ =
∑
q∈QAqfq,

gmin  g  gmax,
1T (Mλ+ u− g) = 0,
H(Mλ+ u− g)  c.
The last two constraints contain both decision variables
and couple the IPSO and ITSO optimization problems. Let
us introduce Lagrange multipliers γ and µ respectively for
the balance and line flow constraints. The partial Lagrangian
of (22) considering only the coupling constraints is:
L(fq|q∈Q,g, γ,µ)=λTs(λ)+1T c(g)+γ1T (Mλ+ u− g)
+ µT (H(Mλ+ u− g)− c) (23)
with µ  0. Since L(fq|q∈Q,g, γ,µ) is separable, we can
minimize over fq|q∈Q and g in two separate subproblems, al-
lowing us to use standard dual decomposition with projected
subgradient methods to find the optimal price. Consider a
sequence {γ(k)} and {µ(k)} of Lagrange multipliers gen-
erated by the iterative decomposition scheme. Then, at the
k-th iteration, the ITSO solves for the optimal extended graph
8flow λ(k) through a subproblem that has the same structure
as (12), with electricity prices at iteration k, p(k), set as:
p(k) = γ(k)1+HTµ(k). (24)
On the other hand, the subproblem solved by the IPSO is:
g(k) = argming1
T c(g)− (γ(k)1+HTµ(k))Tg (25)
s.t. gmin  g  gmax.
The IPSO then updates the balance and congestion compo-
nents of the LMP, i.e., γ(k) and µ(k), through:(
γ(k+1)
µ(k+1)
)
=
(
γ(k) + αk(1
T (Mλ(k) + u− g(k)))
{µ(k) + αk(H(Mλ(k) + u− g(k))− c)}+
)
(26)
It is shown that with a small enough step size, the dual
decomposition method converges to the solution of (22)
[43]. Hence, if the electricity price p is γ?1 + HTµ? =
limk→∞ γ(k)1+HTµ(k), the market clears and the generator
outputs and system flow will be equal to g∗ and λ∗.
C. Optimal reserve capacity for trial-and-error pricing
In theory, the above algorithm can eliminate the need
for the existence of an ex-ante2 ITSO collaboration for
calculating electricity prices. Instead, imagine that the IPSO
can actually post electricity prices according to (26) and
gradually find the optimal market clearing LMP by observing
the charging demand of the actual transportation system3.
When dealing with unknown demand functions in commodity
pricing, this is referred to as the trial-and-error approach,
see, e.g., [44], for prior use of such approaches in toll design.
Implementing this approach has two requirements:
1) The IPSO should be willing to move away from the
greedy pricing scheme in order to eventually maximize
societal welfare (even though the extra welfare generated
might not be easily quantifiable and the operating point might
not correspond to minimum generation costs);
2) More importantly, primal feasibility is most likely
violated when using Lagrangian relaxation to handle coupling
constraints in (22). This means that when posting prices
according to (26), the IPSO should expect the balance and
flow constraints to be violated in order for the algorithm to
converge, and plan accordingly. In power grids, any unpre-
dictable violation of reliable system operation is referred to
as a contingency (a threat to the security of the system) and
is handled through generation reserves.
Definition V.2. (Reserves) In power grids, a generation re-
serve capacity of r = [rv]v∈B allows the IPSO to compensate
for any demand-supply imbalances after market clearing as
long as yv ∈ [−rv, rv] , or equivalently −r  y  r. This is
2The term ex-ante refers to actions that are adjusted as a result of
forecasting user behavior and not actual observations, while ex-post refers
to actions that are based on actual observations rather than forecasts.
3Note that this is only possible if the time-scale at which the network
flow λ reaches its new equilibrium in response to new posted prices p and
tolls θ is much smaller that the time-scale at which electricity costs or travel
demands change.
typically done by adjusting the output of an already online
generator either upward or downward. Given a reserve
capacity of r, the balance equation will become:
1T (d+ u− g − y) = 0, − r  y  r (27)
where y can be chosen at the IPSO’s discretion after observ-
ing the demand d. The reserve capacity r should be procured
in advance.
Note that the dispatched reserve generation y affects the
line flows and hence the flow constraint becomes:
H(d+ u− g − y)  c. (28)
Here we will use bounds on primal infeasibility to deter-
mine the reserve capacity r that needs to be procured by the
IPSO in this type of ex-post LMP adjustment. For simplicity,
we consider a constant step size rule such that αk = α for
all k. Note that in this scheme, after each price adjustment
iteration p(k), the approximate primal solutions, which are
the last iterate λ(k) and g(k), are actually implemented.
Assume that the IPSO knows that during the k-th iteration,(
|1T (d(k) + u− g(k))|
H(d(k) + u− g(k))− c
)

(
ak
wk
)
, (29)
where d(k) = Mλ(k). For dual first order algorithms such
as dual gradient and dual fast gradient methods (any of
which can be employed by the IPSO for price update), such
bounds were recently provided by [45]. For example, for dual
gradient methods, one possible bound is given by:
(
ak
wk
)
=
3
∥∥∥∥( γ(0)µ(0)
)
−
(
γ?
µ?
)∥∥∥∥
2
α
√
k
1, (30)
where α = αk ≤ 1/Ld,∀k and Ld is the Lipschitz constant
for the dual problem of (22). We now need to show that the
bound in (30) is well-defined.
Lemma V.3. The dual problem of (22) has finite Lipschitz
constant and bounded optimal dual variables, i.e., Ld < ∞
and ‖(γ?,µ?)‖ <∞.
Proof: The finiteness of Ld is a consequence of the
strong convexity of the objective function4 of (22) [45].
Furthermore, we see that (22) is a convex problem with linear
inequality constraints and its optimal objective value is finite
(as we have assumed that at least one feasible generation
mix exists for every possible load profile). Consequently,
strong duality holds for (22) and there exists a set of bounded
optimal dual variables.
To calculate (30), the IPSO has to access to the set of
potentially optimal energy and congestion prices γ and µ.
Without access to travel patterns, an estimate of the upper
bound to ‖(γ?,µ?)‖2 can be evaluated using many methods.
For example, we can calculate these bounds by a) performing
4Recall that sa(λa) is non-negative, convex and increasing (cf. (1)),
therefore the product λasa(λa) is strongly convex.
9Monte-Carlo simulations by setting d to different values be-
tween its upper and lower bounds given the limited capacity
of charging stations (charging stations operating anywhere
until full capacity) [46]; b) studying critical load levels as
suggested in [47]; c) solving a Mathematical Program with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [48]. We chose to solve an
MPEC to find this bound; see Appendix A.
Given (29), the IPSO needs to ensure that (27) and (28)
hold by appropriately choosing a reserve capacity rk to be
procured for each future k to ensure system security.
Proposition V.4. (Security-Constrained Ex-post Price Ad-
justments) Given unit reserve capacity prices ξk at each node
of the power grid for iteration k, the optimal reserve capacity
r?k to be procured at different grid buses for iteration k of
the price adjustment algorithm is given by:
r?k = argmin
rk
ξTk rk (31)
s.t. max
ηj ,∀j,θi,∀i
−θi11Tηj + (Hηj − c)Tθi2 − rTk (θi3 + θi4) ≤ 0,
where the constraint is a piecewise-linear function of rk, and
the numbers (θi,ηj), i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J are given.
Proof: The optimal reserve capacity rk is equal to the
cheapest possible nodal reserve capacity combination that can
restore the network balance and flow constraints under any
possible amount of feasibility violation specified in (29), i.e.,
we have the following robust optimization problem:
r∗k = argminrkξ
T
k rk (32)
s.t.∀ η ∈ N ,∃y : |y|  rk :
{
1T (η − y) = 0
H(η − y)  c
where η = d+ u− g and
N = {η : |1Tη| ≤ ak, Hη − c  wk,ηmin  η  ηmax},
where ηmin and ηmax denotes the minimum/maximum pos-
sible η. Problem (32) is equivalent to:
r∗k = argminrkξ
T
k rk (33)
s.t. ∀ η ∈ N : Q(η, rk) is feasible
where
Q(η, rk) =min
y
0 (34)
s.t. 1Ty = 1Tη, −Hy  c−Hη
− rk  y  rk
If Q(η, rk) is feasible, its dual problem Q∗(η, rk) is bounded
and the dual optimum will be 0. Thus, we can write (33) as:
r∗k = argminrkξ
T
k rk (35)
s.t. ∀ η ∈ N : max
θ∈T
F (η,θ, rk) = 0,
where
T = {θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4)|θ2,θ3,θ4  0, (36)
θ11−HTθ2 − θ3 + θ4 = 0},
F (η,θ, rk) =− θ11Tη + (Hη − c)Tθ2 − rTk (θ3 + θ4).
Since 0 ∈ T , this is equivalent to:
r∗k = argminrkξ
T
k rk (37)
s.t. max
η∈N ,θ∈T
F (η,θ, rk) ≤ 0.
Note that F (η,θ, rk) is neither convex nor concave in η and
θ (bilinear). The constraint set η ∈ N ,θ ∈ T is a polyhedron
and hence, the optimal solution of maxη∈N ,θ∈T F (η,θ, rk)
is one of the extreme points (θi,ηj), i = 1, . . . , I, j =
1, . . . , J of the polyhedrons T and N . This shows that the
constraint is a convex piecewise linear function in rk.
Remark V.5. In general, we have no knowledge of
the extreme points of N and T , and computing
maxη∈N ,θ∈T F (η,θ, rk) is non-trivial. Hence, proper ap-
proximation algorithms need to be studied for solving (31).
However, this is out of the scope of this paper. See [49] for
the treatment of a somewhat similar problem, where the use
of an outer approximation algorithm is proposed. Instead,
in our numerical results, we resort to a sample/scenario-
approximation method [50, Chapter 2.6]. For example, we
replace the set T × N by a finite set {(θi,ηi), i =
1, ..., Ns} ⊆ T ×N . In this case, (37) will be turned into a
convex program with a finite number of linear inequalities.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section investigates the need for the joint EV man-
agement scheme we propose through numerical analysis of
system performance. We focus on the system level optimiza-
tion. We assume that charging stations are publicly owned
infrastructure for the sake of simplicity. This means that we
assume electricity is sold at wholesale prices to EV drivers5.
The transportation network G is shown in Fig. 6. For each
arc (road section), we define the latency function as:
τa(λa) = Ta + λa/10
4, (38)
where Ta is the minimum time required to travel through arc
a. We set γ = $10−3/minute for the cost spent en route.
Note that this might seem like a rather low number but it
would be scaled up by a factor of 10 if electricity is traded
at retail prices instead of wholesale. The power network R
is modeled using the line and generation cost parameters of
the IEEE 9-bus test case, except that several more buses are
modeled as load buses where EVs can charge; also see Fig. 6.
The intermediate nodes, i.e., Winters, Fairfield, Mountain
View and Fremont, are equipped with an FCS. Each FCS
is capable of supplying 1 kWh to an EV every 5 minutes,
and the available charging options are {0, 1, 2, 3} kWh (the
same charging options hold for the origin). It is assumed that
each EV consumes 1 kWh of energy to travel 25 miles, and
5In reality, EV drivers may purchase flat rate charging services from for-
profit entities that trade with the wholesale market and can use appropriate
economic incentives (similar to the tolls discussed in this paper) and
recommendation systems to guide the customers towards optimal stations.
This is beyond the scope of this work.
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Fig. 6. (Left) The transportation network G for the trip from Davis to San
Jose. The value next to each arc denotes the minimum travel time Ta (in
minutes); (Right) The power network R. The base load uv at each node is
denoted in italic. Each of the intermediate node is equipped with an FCS.
the battery capacity is 6 kWh for all EVs. There are two O-
D pairs considered in the network. Specifically, 50% of the
drivers are traveling from Davis, CA to Mountain View, CA;
and 50% of the drivers are traveling from Davis to San Jose,
CA. At the origin, i.e., Davis, the EVs have an initial charge
of 4 kWh. As such, there are |Q| = 2 classes of users.
In the first numerical example, we study how the total
number of EVs can affect the IPSO/ITSO’s decision. We
assume full IPSO/ITSO cooperation such that the social
optimal problem (22) can be exactly solved. As seen in Fig. 7,
the traffic pattern changes as we gradually increase the total
number of EVs per epoch. For instance, more EVs are routed
through Winters, instead of going to Fairfield from Davis
directly; similar observations are also made for the Fairfield-
Mountain View-San Jose path. This is due to the fact that the
power/transportation network has become more congested,
leading to a different traffic pattern.
Our next step is to study the scenario with ex-ante
IPSO/ITSO cooperation. We compare the myopic pricing
scheme to the dual decomposition approach. The first task
is to investigate the behavior of the system under the my-
opic pricing scheme. The total number of EVs is fixed at
2.26×104 per epoch. In this case, we initialize the electricity
price at each site at $50 per MWh to solve (12). The traffic
pattern against iteration number of this disjoint optimization
is shown in Table II. We observe that the system oscillates
between two traffic patterns, one having the lower average
traveling time and the other one with a lower electricity cost.
As described in Section V-A, this oscillation behavior is due
to the lack of cooperation between the IPSO and ITSO.
We see that at iteration i = 2n, the electricity prices are
the same across the charging stations, therefore the ITSO
Fig. 7. Comparing the traffic pattern against the total number of EVs
per epoch. (Top) Percentage of electricity consumed at each site; (Bottom)
Percentage of traffic leaving from each site.
TABLE II
OSCILLATION OF TRAFFIC PATTERNS WITH THE GREEDY METHOD.
SO DO (i = 2n) DO (i = 2n+ 1)
Davis 67.80 MWh 67.80 MWh 67.80 MWh
@$57.38/MWh @$57.38/MWh @$58.04/MWh
Winters 12.56 MWh 7.227 MWh 15.87 MWh
@$57.38/MWh @$57.38/MWh @$54.50/MWh
Fairfield 49.88 MWh 57.32 MWh 43.52 MWh
@$57.38/MWh @$57.38/MWh @$66.59/MWh
Fremont 22.56 MWh 20.83 MWh 25.23 MWh
@$57.38/MWh @$57.38/MWh @$65.09/MWh
Mtn. View 5.392 MWh 5.031 MWh 5,781 MWh
@$57.38/MWh @$57.38/MWh @$61.73/MWh
Fr. Winters 7,533 7,534 7,936
Fr. Fremont 8,475 8,409 9,375
Fr. Mtn View 2,825 2,825 3,125
Travel time 188.36 min. 188.36 min. 188.39 min.
Objective $30,332.55 $30,364.61 $30,333.06
assigns the traffic by simply minimizing the travel time.
This decision, however, leads to an uneven distribution in
energy consumption across the power networkR. At iteration
i = 2n+1, the IPSO lowers the electricity price at Winters;
and increases the price at Fairfield, Fremont and Mountain
View. This motivates the ITSO to re-assign the traffic pattern.
An interesting point to note is that the disjoint optimization
may even lead to an infeasible IPSO decision when the total
number of EVs considered is large. This is an extreme case of
the example considered in Table I. In this case, the inability of
the greedy pricing method to correctly model the response of
the EV population to posted prices would result in an unsafe
increase of load at locations where the grid is congested and
hence the load needs to be shed to keep transmission lines
as well as transformers safe.
The above example demonstrates that applying myopic
pricing may result in an unstable system. Next, we inves-
tigate the performance of the dual decomposition algorithm
(cf. Proposition V.1), which describes a systematic method
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Fig. 8. (Left) Infeasibility against the iteration number. Notice that primal
infeasibility refers to the `2-norm ‖(ak,wk)‖2. (Right) Objective value of
dual decomposition against the iteration number.
for cooperation between the IPSO and ITSO. Here, the total
number of EVs is fixed at 2.5 × 104 per epoch. The dual
decomposition is initialized by setting γ(0) = 57.5 and
µ0 = 0. As the dual decomposition algorithm is known to
converge to the social optimum, we are interested in studying
its convergence speed with the violation in infeasibility. We
set the step size as αk = 20 for all k and apply the
algorithm on the same scenario as before. For the constant
‖(γ(0),µ(0)) − (γ?,µ?)‖2 in (30), we upper bound it by
solving an MPEC using an approach similar to [48].
We compare both infeasibility measures against the iter-
ation number in Fig. 8 (Left). We can see that the dual
decomposition algorithm converges in approximately 100
iterations, and it returns a solution that is approximately
feasible. We observe a O(1/√k) decaying trend with the
actual infeasibility.
Lastly, we study the effects of ex-post IPSO price adjust-
ment based on the estimated (wk, ak) in (30). The reserve
procurement problem (31) is approximated using a sample-
approximation method, where the candidate η points for N
are selected randomly within the bound [ηmin,ηmax]. We
assume that the reserve capacity is purchased at a price of
$55.00 per MWh at all sites. Here, an interesting comparison
is the overall cost needed to purchase such reserve capacity
and the cost to operate the system under (the estimated)
infeasibility, i.e., the dual objective value. The overall cost
is shown in Fig. 8 (Right) as ‘Dual obj.+Reserve Cost’.
We observe that such cost is always higher than the social
optimum cost due to a possible mismatch between the
electricity cost per unit in purchasing the reserve capacity;
yet the difference decreases as the iteration number grows.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The implications of large-scale integration of EVs on
power and transportation networks, leading to an inter-
dependency between the two infrastructures, were studied
under a static setting. We saw that a collaboration between
the IPSO and the ITSO can lead EVs towards a socially
optimal traffic pattern and energy footprint, and highlighted
the adverse effects of ignoring the interconnection between
the two infrastructures. We further analyzed the reserve
capacity requirements of operating the grid without a direct
collaboration between the IPSO and ITSO. These results
were obtained under an ideal static setting and in the absence
of retail markets. Important issues remain to be studied in
future work. For example, EV charging facilities are expected
to be privately-owned, and hence pricing decisions would
be left to profit-maximizing entities competing against each
other to attract EV drivers to their station. This would affect
the IPSO’s ability to impose taxes on many arcs in the
extended transportation graph and would lower the IPSO’s
ability to maximize social welfare. The impact of hourly
dynamics of electricity prices and travel patterns is another
important aspect that requires further analysis. In this case,
non-convexities of the dynamic traffic assignment problem
would extend to the IPSO’s price design problem.
APPENDIX A
MPEC FOR FINDING (γ?,µ?) IN (30)
To compute the bound (30), we need an upper bound on
‖(γ∗,µ∗)‖2. To calculate such a bound, we use an MPEC
to enumerate all the possible EV demand valus and their
corresponding optimal dual variables (γ∗,µ∗):
max
d,γ,µ,zL,zU
‖(γ,µ)‖2
s.t. 0 ≤ zL ≤ δ1, 0 ≤ zU ≤ δ1,
dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax,
ming 1
T c(g)
s.t. zU : g ≤ gmax, zL : −g ≤ −gmin
γ : 1T (d+ u− g) = 0
µ : H(d+ u− g) ≤m,
where dmin,dmax are lower/upper bounds to the electricity
demand d requested by the EVs and δ > 0 is a regularization
parameter for the power generation constraints. As seen in
(17), the lower-level minimization problem finds the optimal
dispatch g and hence the optimal dual variables (γ,µ) for
each of the possible demand profiles dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax.
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